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Abstract. The change from consensual decision-making arrangements into centralized hierarchical chieftaincy
schemes through colonization disrupted many rural conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa. In addition, climate
change impacts on land use have introduced additional socio-ecological factors that complicate rural conflict
dynamics. Despite the current urgent need for conflict-sensitive adaptation, resolution efficiency of these fused
rural institutions has hardly been documented. In this context, we analyse the Loitoktok network for implemented
resource conflict resolution structures and identify potential actors to guide conflict-sensitive adaptation. This is
based on social network data and processes that are collected using the saturation sampling technique to analyse
mechanisms of brokerage. We find that there are three different forms of fused conflict resolution arrangements
that integrate traditional institutions and private investors in the community. To effectively implement conflict-
sensitive adaptation, we recommend the extension officers, the council of elders, local chiefs and private investors
as potential conduits of knowledge in rural areas. In conclusion, efficiency of these fused conflict resolution
institutions is aided by the presence of holistic resource management policies and diversification in conflict
resolution actors and networks.
1 Introduction
Most African ethnic groups coexist peacefully with high
degrees of mixing through inter-ethnic marriage, economic
partnerships, and shared values that have been nurtured pa-
tiently over millennia (Aapengnuo, 2010). As a result, the
management of conflicts before colonization was guided by
indigenous governance institutions that established consen-
sual decision-making arrangements at the grassroots (ECA,
2007). This administrative role was later transferred to chief-
taincies created by colonial governments that sought to im-
pose hierarchical rule on its subjects (Osaghae, 1989). Af-
ter independence, many African countries opted to main-
tain colonial administrative structures and chieftaincy. To in-
crease effectiveness in rural governance, local chiefs were
elevated to custodians of customary law and communal as-
sets, with a responsibility to dispense justice, resolve con-
flicts and enforce contracts (ECA, 2005). This action created
co-management regimes composed of diverse stakeholders,
representing divergent interests and interacting directly over
a period of time to resolve a specific conflict within their lo-
cality (Brunner et al., 2005).
However, the seemingly “stable” African conflict dialogue
is currently becoming complicated through additional socio-
ecological factors from unpredictable climatic conditions
(Carius, 2009). There is a broad scientific debate whether and
how climate change may act as a “threat-multiplier” and will
increase resource conflicts in sub-Sahara Africa (Lobell et
al., 2008) among resource-dependent rural communities with
low adaptive capacity (AMCEN, 2011; Haldén, 2007; WRI
et al., 2005). For clarity, a resource conflict is defined in a
wide sense as a situation whereby two or more parties (indi-
viduals or groups) have or perceive to have, (a) incompatible
livelihood goals and interests, or (b) are in direct resource
competition with each other and act upon these differences
(UNEP, 2009, 2011).
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Adaptation measures addressing impacts of climate
change on rural livelihoods have already been instituted glob-
ally to moderate potential damages and/or exploit beneficial
opportunities (IPCC, 2007). But rigid demarcation into sec-
toral tasks of adaptation programmes can fall short when
it comes to conflict. Thus, a more systematic, integrated
approach is necessary to meaningfully incorporate existing
conflict dynamics – as well as overarching socio-political
and economic conditions – into the design of adaptation
measures. This creates the need for conflict-sensitive adap-
tation strategies to enhance sustainable development (Tän-
zler et al., 2013). Conflict-sensitivity refers to approaches and
measures that display cognisance of how climate change can
cause conflicts; climate adaptation projects themselves can
contribute to conflict, and adaptation measures would operate
in conflict zones (Yanda and Bronkhorst, 2011). Such knowl-
edge allows planners and decision-makers to address cur-
rent vulnerabilities and development priorities, while aiming
to ensure long-term sustainability and peace through a basic
understanding of future projections (Yanda and Bronkhorst,
2011).
Consequently, this article seeks to address two knowl-
edge gaps through this paper. First, effectiveness of the
fusion between indigenous mechanisms with conventional
and western conflict resolution approaches is still in ques-
tion (ECA, 2007). Second, few studies have documented
actual rural structures and mechanisms used to resolve re-
source conflicts in the sub-Saharan grassroots (Hyden et
al., 2005). To this end, we critically evaluate conflict res-
olution mechanisms of the water, agriculture and wildlife
sectors of Loitoktok Sub-County in Southern Kenya. We
then use the brokerage concept under social network analysis
to identify central conflict resolution actors with the poten-
tial to guide implementation of conflict-sensitive adaptation
(Yanda and Bronkhorst, 2011). We hypothesize that the pres-
ence of diverse stakeholders in the conflict-resolution pro-
cess contributes to high potential success in implementation
of conflict-sensitive adaptation in Loitoktok. Our discussion
intends to further clarify local conflict dynamics influencing
adaptive capacity, social cohesion and rural development in
Kenya, as well as to contribute to the climate-security dis-
course in Africa.
The paper begins with a brief summary on the evolution
of resource governance in Africa. Then it elucidates capac-
ity challenges of current rural resource governance in dealing
with potential climate-driven conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa
and expounds on the use of social network theory in diag-
nosing resource governance. Thirdly, a description is given
of the case study area of Loitoktok and the method used for
collecting and analysing social network data. The results and
discussion are thereafter presented based on identified con-
flict resolution mechanisms at the grassroots and their poten-
tial in the climate adaptation discourse. A brief conclusion is
given on key highlights from the study.
2 Evolution of resource governance in Africa
Governance is defined as “the effective management of pub-
lic affairs through the generation of a regime (set of rules)
accepted as legitimate, for the purpose of promoting and en-
hancing societal values sought by individuals and groups”
(Hyden et al., 2005). It takes place through diverse institu-
tions in a society, whereby, an institution is likewise defined
as an enduring collection of formal laws and informal rules,
norms, customs, codes of conduct, and organized practices
that shape and govern human interaction (IDRC, 2009).
African indigenous institutions of governance were altered
radically by colonial occupation that established a central-
ized governance system through the formalized chieftaincy
tactic that became the foundation of post-colonial govern-
ments of many African countries (Cheka, 2008). After inde-
pendence, the chieftaincy mandate was further altered dur-
ing fundamental restructuring of socioeconomic systems by
African political entities (ECA, 2007). Maintenance of the
chieftaincy position was disputed by some who were con-
cerned with rapid growth and transformation of African
economies. For example, the late Tom Mboya quoted in Os-
aghae (1989) stated
Chieftaincy impedes the pace of development as
it reduces the relevance of the State in the area of
social services.
Proponents of the chieftaincy stratagem highlighted dif-
ferences between the two systems that were clearly seen es-
pecially during conflict resolution, for example the colonial
(modern) legal system operates on the basis of an adversar-
ial approach while the traditional decision-making systems
function on the basis of consensual decision-making and rec-
onciliation arrangements (ECA, 2007; IDRC, 2009; IIDEA,
2011). Furthermore, since traditional institutions are indis-
pensable for political transformation in Africa, post-colonial
governments opted to incorporate indigenous knowledge into
local administration regulations to increase positive percep-
tion of the government by the masses (ECA, 2007).
Similarly, natural resources are embedded in a shared so-
cial space where complex and unequal relations are estab-
lished among a wide range of social actors, e.g. in the case
of the production of primary products, there is a mix of agro-
export producers and farmers, ethnic minorities, government
agencies and others (Mwanika, 2010). However, the “one-
size-fits-all” governance approach introduced by colonial-
ists gave poor outcomes especially in the water, wildlife and
forest sectors, thereby necessitating establishment of rural
participatory resource management approaches to promote
community-based resource management and conservation in
developing countries (Berkes, 2004). The inclusion of in-
digenous institutions and knowledge was important because
they guide how people negotiate access to resources and re-
duce (though not avoid altogether) negative effects of con-
flict or drought (Eriksen and Lind, 2009). Apart from indige-
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nous institutions, many developing countries are currently
implementing poverty-reduction schemes that target the un-
employed and marginalized groups. In Kenya, the state has
established among others the Revolving Fund for women and
youth community groups seeking to access business funds
to improve their living standards (Ngaruiya and Scheffran,
2013).
Consequently, three main types of institutional governance
systems are active in rural Africa.
Traditional institutions are defined as a power, permission
or an institution emanating from indigenous authority
that draws its legitimacy, whether wholly or partially,
from tribal/ethnic/cultural values of a group of peo-
ple that share them (Cheka, 2008). Such traditional in-
stitutions have either centralized or decentralized gov-
ernance systems. Centralized systems had kings and
monarchs such as the Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Buganda
(Uganda) and Ashanti (Ghana) while decentralized sys-
tems comprise a council of elders found among the
Kikuyu and Maasai (Kenya), the gada (age-set) system
of the Oromo in Ethiopia, or the Ibo village assembly in
Nigeria (ECA, 2007).
Formal institutions are state-sponsored institutions that
were mostly inherited from colonialism and constitute
the written or codified rules such as the constitution,
judiciary laws, organized markets, and property rights
(IDRC, 2009; Mowo et al., 2013).
Informal institutions are the patterns of interdependence
and actions among individuals who build themselves
into different structural configurations to improve their
living conditions or enhance resource exploitation. The
actor linkages formed across the community vary by re-
ligion, ethnic identity, mode of production and are man-
ifested as social networks (Prell et al., 2010).
When formal, informal and traditional institutions com-
plement each other at different prefectures and different
tiers, stakeholders are able to integrate diverse but relatable
sources of knowledge to broaden resolution alternatives that
might otherwise have been missed (Irwin et al., 2007). How-
ever, institutional incoherence is a major obstacle to effective
governance. Incoherence occurs when governance institu-
tions become incompatible to each other, with consequences
such as hindrances in decision-making, wastage of financial
resources or even deepened conflicting relationships at the
grassroots (IDRC, 2009; Mowo et al., 2013). A practical in-
coherence example is seen in local adaptive capacity projects
that are characterized by conflicting, overlapping mandates
and dysfunctional arrangements in inter-agency integration
as a result of weak coordination that subsequently gives poor
outcomes (Madzwamuse, 2010). In relation to this study, ef-
fective resource conflict governance calls for incorporation
of indigenous knowledge with a formal conflict resolution
institution to create flexible systems of resource manage-
ment termed as adaptive co-management systems. These sys-
tems become tailored to specific places and situations and are
supported by and work with various organizations at differ-
ent levels (Folke et al., 2005). Furthermore, effective adap-
tive co-management must involve multiple stakeholders to
enhance governance outcomes because local people know
each other better, have more rapport and sense of belong-
ing that creates opportunities for cooperation and collective
action, for managing natural resources on a self-ruling and
self-sufficient basis at the grassroots (Mowo et al., 2013).
Against this background, issues of governance and institu-
tional coherence turn out to be relevant for our inquiry into
the role of culture in social cohesion at the grassroots.
Capacity challenges in addressing climate-driven rural
conflicts
Climate change has been described as a “threat-multiplier”
that may intensify existing social, economic, political and
environmental problems that communities are already fac-
ing. Impacts of climate change are predicted to exacerbate
grievances; overwhelm coping capacities; and, in extreme
times, spur forced or proactive migration (WBGU, 2008;
Yanda and Bronkhorst, 2011). Climate change predictions
for Africa suggest increasing scarce water resources associ-
ated with declining and failing agricultural yields in the Horn
of Africa (Carius, 2009). Some studies predict a significant
increase in armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030
compared to the 1980–2000 period (Burke et al., 2009; Lo-
bell et al., 2008) though others challenge this claim (Buhaug,
2010; O’Loughlin et al., 2012). Various studies find mixed
results on the climate-conflict link in East Africa (Ide et
al., 2014; O’Loughlin et al., 2012; Raleigh and Kniveton,
2012; Schilling et al., 2012; Witsenburg and Adano, 2009).
Land is not just a material resource that people compete
over, but it also forms the basis of a particular way of life
(farmer, pastoralist, fisher etc.); gives an ethnic identity; and
defines gender and age roles (Mwanika, 2010). Figure 1 illus-
trates possible paths to conflicts induced by climate change
in a typical rural village scenario in Kenya. These paths are
termed as conflict constellations which are divided into four,
namely, water stress, food insecurity, storm and flood dis-
asters, and migration issues (WBGU, 2008; Ossenbrügge,
2009). Cumulative impacts from climate change on key rural
livelihood activities, such as agriculture and wildlife tourism,
subsequently decrease (or cause failed) harvests and also in-
crease farm raids by wildlife from neighbouring protected
lands. Subsequent loss of income in rain-dependent commu-
nities lowers the spending power and increases local poverty
levels. This affects the vulnerability of households with land
as their main asset and additional source of income, espe-
cially for rural households experiencing poor harvests and
livestock productivity in Kenya (Ntiati, 2002). Consequently,
subdivision and sale of land to “outsiders” due to their per-
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Figure 1. Conflict constellations in relation to climate change and rural land tenure. Source: the authors.
ceived higher capability of enhancing the economic status of
the “locals” disrupts the cultural norms and trusts of indige-
nous host communities through exposure to dissimilar immi-
grant norms and attitudes.
On the one hand, introduced norms could be beneficial like
reduction of female genital mutilation. On the contrary, im-
migrants are perceived as “threats” who reduce power and
influence of tribal chieftains, elites or local politicians. Such
divisive thinking is grounded on the parochialism of commu-
nities in conceding the rights and interests of other commu-
nities (Western, 1994). In the extreme, if civic education is
not foremost in the community then such a fragile “host vs.
immigrant” situation creates fertile grounds for mobilizing
citizens along ethnic or cultural lines by politicians vying for
elective posts by promising “equal” resource allocation. Sub-
sequently, people may retreat to their ethnic cocoons and agi-
tate for social respite from the government. Such a “domino”
effect clearly demonstrates the link between climate change
impacts and resource conflicts whereby a decrease in ecosys-
tem services production leads to increased rural poverty that
gradually draws ever-deeper lines of division in social rela-
tions and triggers resource conflicts (WBGU, 2008). Hence,
the sale of land to “outsiders” leads to reduced land holdings,
reduced grazing area, increased incidences of overgrazing,
fencing – all of which lead to reduced adaptive capacity. In
the absence of conflict-sensitive adaptation programs, these
resource conflicts become cyclic and reduce the ability of the
community to adapt.
Adaptation funding is already being made available and
adaptation projects are under way in many rural communities
(Yanda and Bronkhorst, 2011). However, escalating cases of
resource conflicts are projected to overwhelm rural conflict
resolution mechanisms and reinforce the trend towards gen-
eral instability and insecurity that already exists in many so-
cieties and regions (WBGU, 2008). We find that this prog-
nosis is supported by three main capacity concerns drawn
from the literature on climate change and resource conflicts
in Africa:
a. Handmer et al. (1999) posit that poorer regions and
countries will have difficulty in adapting to climate
change, since they lack comprehensive technical and
financial ability. In addition, African governments are
faced with other major developmental issues such as
conflict, diseases and poverty that require direct engage-
ment by the state (AMCEN, 2011). Hence, at the mo-
ment climate change adaptation policies seem unlikely
to be successful or minimize inequality in Africa.
b. Adaptation is not just a technical process but also a po-
litical process since power relations need to be adjusted
for individuals and groups to achieve discrete interests
to maintain their own livelihoods (Eriksen and Lind,
2009). Poor understanding of the African society struc-
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ture and preference for “foreign” non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) with disparate interests in formu-
lating the African adaptation agenda has resulted in poor
representation of the grassroots level in the climate dis-
course, yet they are the most affected group (Hellmuth
et al., 2007; Madzwamuse, 2010).
c. Poor representation subsequently creates the third ca-
pacity challenge of marginalization of customary law
in climate change policy-making at both national and
international levels, despite the high significance of in-
digenous knowledge in the African society (AMCEN,
2011). Moreover, education systems also neglect in-
digenous knowledge in school curricula concerning en-
vironmental studies due to the negative undertone given
to cultural practises by colonial governments.
These three adaptive capacity issues infer that coher-
ence between governance institutions is critical in prevent-
ing competition over resources turning into a violent conflict
(Adano et al., 2012; Young, 2011). This is because effec-
tive adaptation can also serve as a “threat minimizer” that
brings together actors from security arrangements, conflict
resolution and asset management sectors to strengthen lo-
cal adaptive capacity while reducing predicted conflict cases
(Donnelly-Roark et al., 2001). Furthermore, opportunities
for incorporating climate information into development ac-
tivities in sub-Saharan Africa are largely being missed at
the moment (Hellmuth et al., 2007). This is mainly because
selecting representatives in resource governance institutions
becomes a complicated process since African rural commu-
nities are composed of diverse informal interest groups that
are formed as forums for exchanging knowledge, accessing
development funds and markets for their products (Ngaruiya
and Scheffran, 2013).
3 Use of social network theory in resource
governance studies
Incorporation of social network analysis into resource gov-
ernance has rejuvenated studies in natural resource manage-
ment by introducing a quantitative approach to political, eco-
nomic or social processes in connection to structural and
environmental processes (Bodin and Prell, 2011). A social
network is composed primarily of interdependent actors to-
gether with the social relations (ties) linking these actors to-
gether for transfer or flow of resources (Bodin and Prell,
2011). Social networks can be viewed as a graph that con-
sists of nodes (actors) joined by lines (relations) which allows
researchers to uncover patterns that might otherwise go un-
detected (Prell et al., 2010). Network analysis fundamentally
differs from standard social science research because rather
than focusing on attributes of autonomous individual units;
it views characteristics of the social units as arising out of
structural or relational processes to reveal theoretical moti-
vations behind social relationships that shape environmental
outcomes (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Of interest to this study is how social network analysis fa-
cilitates identification of stakeholder positions in a network
and how these actors link various parts of the network to-
gether (Bodin and Prell, 2011; Ngaruiya et al., 2015). Sev-
eral mathematical indices are used to quantitatively define
this importance or prominence of an individual actor within
their social network. Equation (1) defines the betweenness
centrality index that counts the number of network pathways
passing through an actor and is used to measure how much
potential control an actor has in disseminating accurate and







where CB(k) is the betweenness centrality of actor k, ∂ikj is
the number of paths linking actors i and j that pass through
actor k, and ∂ij is the number of paths linking actor i and j .
This definition is based on the assumption that interactions
between two nonadjacent actors might depend on other ac-
tors, especially the actors who lie on the path between the
two (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A practical implication of
this index is that if actors rest between many others, then they
have the ability to “broker” adaptation information to other
actors and thereby influence the level of collective knowl-
edge in the community. If brokers are active within a commu-
nity, they will not only influence the quantity of knowledge
but will also enhance the quality of knowledge circulating be-
cause they are able to connect diverse stakeholders to solve
a common resource problem. For example, if a community
has well-equipped brokers then the local ability to adapt to
climate change increases the potential for peaceful conflict
resolution and conflict transformation (Tänzler et al., 2013).
On the other hand, unrestrained brokerage can create organi-
zation chaos, manifest in errors such as resources allocated
to conflicting goals and units in the same organization com-
peting against one another (Burt, 2011). A practical example
of poor brokerage is how immense adaptation funding has
caused a proliferation of actors offering diverse “expertise”
in rural communities but with poor performance outcomes
in many rural areas (Madzwamuse, 2010). Despite this flaw,
brokerage is an interesting concept that is yet to be exhaus-
tively applied in resource governance in Africa.
For that reason this paper uses social network analysis con-
cepts to evaluate rural conflict resolution mechanisms, their
structure and how central actors can be used to implement
conflict-sensitive adaptation strategies at the grassroots.
4 Method
4.1 Area description
Our area of focus is Loitoktok Sub-County in Kajiado
County, located at the southern tip of the former Rift Valley
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province in Kenya and covers ca. 6356.3 km2. It is situated
between longitudes 36◦5′ and 37◦5′ E and between latitudes
1◦0′ and 3◦0′ S and borders the Republic of Tanzania to the
West adjacent to Mt. Kilimanjaro (Government of Kenya,
2009). Ecologically, it is categorized among the arid and
semi-arid areas in Kenya. The first census in 1962 showed
a population of 24027 persons while the current estimated
population for 2012 is 171 520 persons. The Sub-County has
an estimated annual population growth rate of 4.51 % as per
last census count (Government of Kenya, 2009). Loitoktok
was formerly known as a district but changed into a Sub-
County following promulgation of the 2010 constitution that
created new administrative units consisting of Counties and
Sub-Counties.
Loitoktok was selected as representative of a typical
Kenyan rural area because of (a) its vibrant water, agricul-
ture, and wildlife sectors, (b) rapid land subdivision, (c) in-
troduction of diverse cultures by immigrants with different
livelihood practises apart from pastoralism of the Maasai
community. In addition, evidence of environmental impacts
related to climate change have locally been documented
through changes in precipitation (Thompson et al., 2009),
temperature fluctuations (Altmann et al., 2002), wildlife
mortality (Wangai et al., 2013) and agricultural production
(Ngaruiya, 2014) in Loitoktok.
In terms of governance institutions and stakeholder diver-
sity, Loitoktok’s rich wildlife supports a strong tourism sec-
tor characterized by many hotels and lodges and is rated
as one of the key wildlife tourism areas in Kenya. Inter-
estingly, unmonitored land subdivision and climate variabil-
ity, increased cases of wildlife poaching and human-wildlife
conflicts also created opportunities for establishment of sev-
eral wildlife organizations promoting conservation of local
biodiversity. Additionally, due to the Sub-County’s’ remote
and semiarid location, several non-governmental organiza-
tions were started to boost the education, water and health
sectors in collaboration with government agencies.
4.2 Data collection and analysis
Field work was conducted in March–May and October–
December 2012. Information was sought on the resource
conflict resolution process for water, wildlife and agricul-
ture sectors. A simple questionnaire collected relational (so-
cial network) data of actor linkages using the saturation sam-
pling technique within the Loitoktok community. A respon-
dent was asked to name five persons they share collabo-
rations with during conflict resolution and resource gover-
nance, whereby the named actors were located (where pos-
sible) and asked to name their collaborators, which went on
until no new names were mentioned.
Thereafter, the social network data were converted into an
actor matrix and analysed for brokerage using the algorithm
for betweenness centrality that finds the geodesics in the net-
work and then computes potential connections of every actor
in the community. The resultant data were then visualized as
a sociograph using NetDraw™ that efficiently illustrates the
actual situation at the grassroots (Borgatti et al., 2002).
5 Results and discussion
The respondents comprised of 152 persons drawn from four
sectors (water, agriculture, wildlife tourism and community)
and also included expert interviews in Nairobi, Kajiado and
Loitoktok towns. The questionnaire also guided six group
discussions in Loitoktok All respondents agreed that inclu-
sion of culture in the conflict resolution process gave the
community confidence in decisions agreed after delibera-
tions and that the main aim of a conflict resolution was to
reduce tension or violence by bringing the conflicting parties
together. This coincides with principles of natural resource
management that emphasize the need for cooperation as a
necessary precondition for sustainable conflict resolution.
Table 1 illustrates practically how different resource con-
flicts were resolved between November 2011 and November
2012 at Oloolopon Division in Loitoktok. It is evident that re-
solving resource conflict is not the responsibility of a single
person or institution, but that minor conflicts were resolved
by a small stakeholder meeting that was trusted to recom-
mend fair decisions for aggrieved parties, e.g. conflict over
water at Impriron. The most recommended discipline mea-
sure is compensation by the guilty actors to the aggrieved
party according to the level of destruction or damage. In ex-
treme cases, when the community felt aggrieved and the sit-
uation was thought to likely spread community tension, the
chief was obligated to call for joint meetings (barazas) for
all relevant stakeholders and the entire community.
This real-life reflection confirms that chiefs and other tra-
ditional authorities also have the potential to mitigate ethnic
conflicts by applying traditional conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms to narrow differences (ECA, 2007). The survey also
confirms coherence among the different institutions involved
in resource conflict resolution.
5.1 Rural conflict resolution schemes
Three main conflict resolving systems borne from coopera-
tive efforts were identified in Loitoktok (Fig. 2). These are
the following:
a. Policy-guided conflict resolution plan
Water scarcity was identified as a driver for resource con-
flict, especially during the dry seasons in Loitoktok. As stip-
ulated in the Water Act of 2002, the Ministry of Water man-
dates its local government agency – Water Resources Man-
agement Authority (WRMA) – to resolve local water con-
flicts together with the Water Resource Users Association
(WRUA). The local chief is an optional mediator in the pres-
ence of water officials. If the conflict is not resolved through
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Table 1. The annual resource conflict report of Chief Leonard Kasine in-charge of Oloolopon Division in Loitoktok Sub-County (WRMA:
Water Resources Management Authority, KWS: Kenya Wildlife Service).
Resource No. of conflicts Conflict site Resolution Stakeholders involved
3 Shurie Compensation Council of elders, Chief and residents
Water 7 Impiron Community discussion WRMA and Chief
1 Airstrip Community discussion Nolturesh Water Board and Chief
16 Korinko village Fine after agricultural assessment Agricultural extension officers, police, Chief
Livestock 26 Inkariak-Rongena 4 fined by court, 22 fined after Agricultural extension officers, police, Chief
agricultural assessment
11 Kamukunji Compensation to farmer Agricultural extension officers, Chief
Wildlife 30 Sompet Compensation KWS, Private investor – Elephant Research Org.6 Ilmisigiyio Compensation KWS, African Wildlife Foundation
Figure 2. The diverse resource conflict resolution schemes in Loitoktok Sub-County.
negotiation then it is either forwarded to the courts for legal
action against the offender or to the Water Appeals Board
for further arbitration. An interesting aspect is that WRMA
also gives grants to approved WRUA’s projects that target
enhanced water supply and quality. This clearly has encour-
aged the community to participate in the prescribed regular
training sessions for enhancing local water governance.
Evidently, a well-formulated resource policy is recognized
as the first key step in effectively resolving resource con-
flicts at the grassroots level. Thus the Water Act clearly sets
out the conflict resolution process and also empowers the re-
source users with knowledge of their rights as resource users.
For example, Loitoktok WRUA members undertake citizen
arrests of persons breaking water laws, especially upstream
farmers who over-extract water.
b. Quasi-formal conflict resolution plan
This structural arrangement is predominantly used to solve
two forms of conflict that affect agricultural output. These are
the following: (i) human–wildlife conflicts that occur when
wildlife invades farms for fodder or livestock (prey) and/or
to access water sources. (ii) Farmer–pastoralist conflicts that
occur when livestock destroy crops while trying to access
watering points since communal grazing areas have been
lost following subdivision of community group ranches. The
agricultural conflict resolution committee comprises of the
formal council of elders (administrative type), the local chief,
agricultural extension officers and police. This arrangement
is termed as quasi-formal because the elders and chief are
nominated from the community by the government, unlike
in the water sector that only works with civil servants in con-
flict resolution. The committee uses a crop damage or live-
stock death report prepared by the extension officer to guide
negotiations after which the aggrieved party is compensated
either in kind (livestock) or in cash form. Police is involved to
ensure that the conflict resolution process can be transferred
to court if the offender fails to fulfil the stipulated compensa-
tion. Though the council of elders is part of the community
sometimes the community perceives their unfavourable rul-
ings with suspicion as if they represent the government.
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c. Hybrid site-specific conflict resolution plan
The wildlife sector exhibits a unique conflict resolution strat-
egy as a result of inadequate government policies. This
strategy comprises the traditional council of elders, formal
government agencies, private investors and researchers who
come together to cover shortcomings of the wildlife con-
flict management strategy. For example, previous absence of
compensation for livestock deaths and crop destruction by
wildlife led to wanton slaughter of lions, elephants, or ze-
bras. Now, modest payments to aggrieved families by private
investors such as Mr Luke of Olkeri Sanctuary for losses in-
curred by predators or elephants have reduced cases of re-
venge wildlife killings. Another example was seen at the
Mbirikani group ranch whereby game scouts (members of
the community) conduct regular patrols. Respondents stated
that since the community wildlife policing project has be-
gun, the poaching levels have been reduced. This site-specific
measure infers that community members are prone to cohe-
sively use their own knowledge if they are assisted in de-
veloping an efficient way of collaboration to enhance their
livelihoods.
Though this mechanism seems to be effective, it does not
comprehensively deal with the fundamental cause of human–
wildlife conflicts. This is because no policy exists on how to
ensure survival of wildlife during drought episodes to prevent
the recurrent human–wildlife conflicts. In addition, poor un-
derstanding of the wildlife management policy has also ex-
posed the community to manipulation by politicians seeking
voter mileage at the expense of the human–wildlife incidents.
From this study, it is evident that the resource conflict
resolution process involves interaction among diverse actors
which in turn increases local civic knowledge, community
participation and shows respect to cultural practices that to-
gether strengthen rural community networks. This also sig-
nals effectiveness of the fusion between indigenous and con-
ventional conflict resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, inte-
gration of diverse stakeholders provides a basis to broaden
institutional networks and partnerships through alternative
livelihood activities that may boost the local economy. How-
ever the need to overhaul the land policy in Kenya cannot
be overlooked. Respondents stated that a comprehensively
developed land policy will establish zones for different de-
velopment purposes and allocate buffer zones to reduce inci-
dences of encroachment and human–wildlife conflict in pro-
tected areas. This action will ensure that future urban expan-
sion will not lead to resource competition or unequal distri-
bution in rural areas of Kenya.
5.2 Loitoktok social governance structure
Scrutiny of the resource governance and conflict resolu-
tion structures reveal 86 actors in 23 formal institutions
(government agencies), 16 informal institutions (community
groups), 46 private organizations and 1 traditional institu-
tion. These institutions belong to four main sectors namely,
agriculture, wildlife and forestry, water resources and com-
munity management that implement resource governance
through collaborative actions from 30, 31, 11 and 14 actors
from the respective sectors.
Figure 3 gives an illustration of how actors are connected
and also identifies actors who occupy the central position in
Loitoktok. Full names of actors are contained in the supple-
ment. These actors are more visible, have the highest de-
gree of ties and are involved centrally in resource conflict
resolution in the network. They include the following: Sub-
County Agricultural Officer (SCAO), Sub-County Kenya
Wildlife Service (SCKWS) Officer, Sub-County Livestock
Officer (SCLO), Sub-County Government (SCG) Officer,
Social Development Officer (SDO), Sub-County Water Of-
ficer (SCWO), Sub-County Kenya Forest Service (SCKFS)
Officer and game scouts. The calculated betweenness scores
that indicate the network influence of the identified central
actors are 718.5, 670.5, 179.5, 165, 151, 80, 78 and 78, in
the same order respectively. These values represent currently
missing links to neighbouring actors that can be potential
links available for each actor to use in increasing the num-
ber of connection in the network. The eight actors have the
highest ability to build resource knowledge and ecosystem
dynamics so that the community can collectively respond to
environmental feedback in a fashion that contributes to re-
silience. The rest of the actors have betweenness scores of
less than 10 and thus have a small effect on information dis-
semination and control within the larger community.
By empowering the central actors to actively create con-
nections that span across different resource sectors then
the community can strengthen the local governance strategy
for effective problem-focused community resource manage-
ment. This is discussed below.
5.3 Building conflict-sensitive adaptation
Conflict resolution is critical to adaptation as conflict restricts
many drought adjustments involving peaceful interaction be-
tween many diverse stakeholders. Conflict-sensitive adapta-
tion becomes therefore a holistic, multi-scaled and multi-
sectored approach that taps into the wealth of traditional
knowledge regarding the management of resources and con-
flicts at a community level (Yanda and Bronkhorst, 2011).
Conflict-sensitive adaptation processes must be approached
using a multi-dimensional system that incorporates different
levels, both administrative and societal (Tänzler et al., 2013).
This study postulates that central actors, who hold the net-
work together in times of distress, also have potential to in-
fluence adaptation information quality and flow in the net-
work.
Loitoktok actors who should be equipped with adaptation
knowledge to “broker” to the community are the following:
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Figure 3. Social network illustrating actor linkages in resource governance at Loitoktok community.
a. Extension officers
These are the Sub-County Agricultural Officer (SCAO), Sub-
County Livestock Officer (SCLO), Sub-County Kenya Forest
Service (SCKFS) Officer and Sub-County Kenya Wildlife
Service (SCKWS) Officer. The extension officers are well
connected to their respective community interest groups (in-
formal institutions) and thus can be effective in transfer of
adaptation knowledge. The community indicated that water
and wildlife sectors recorded the highest number of conflicts
and subsequent studies have confirmed low adaptation mea-
sures in these two sectors. Conversely, crop and livestock
sectors have the most diverse adaptation measures due to
a close public–private actor partnership (Ngaruiya, 2014).
Therefore, specialized training of extension officers in adap-
tation technology and water harvesting for subsequent trans-
fer to the community will not only buffer food security (crop
and livestock products) but will also strengthen the local
economy through creation of additional livelihood opportu-
nities in a climate change context.
b. Council of elders
In Loitoktok, the outstanding traditional institution is the
Council of Elders that is made up of persons of integrity and
objectivity who have distinguished themselves in one way or
another and have been recognized as such by the commu-
nity (Cheka, 2008). There are two types of Council of El-
ders. First, the Council of Elders that is appointed by the
State and is made up of men from the three major tribes
in the Sub-County to help in administration issues such as
immigration and conflict resolution in the agriculture sector
(quasi-formal). Secondly, the dominant host Maasai commu-
nity exclusively selects its indigenous Maasai Council of El-
ders (traditional institution) according to its culture which is
also respected by other communities in Loitoktok. This coun-
cil is highly regarded in the wildlife sector where it plays
a key role in either agitating for action by the government
and investors or calming the Maasai community after a se-
rious human–wildlife incident. Interestingly from the social
network analysis, the council of elders is not among the top
central actors because of the administrative dichotomy in the
Sub-County. But the fact still remains that they are well con-
nected to each resource sector, thereby giving them a stronger
knowledge dissemination power in the community.
www.earth-syst-dynam.net/7/441/2016/ Earth Syst. Dynam., 7, 441–452, 2016
450 G. W. Ngaruiya and J. Scheffran: Networks in resource conflict resolution
In terms of judgements and costs, indigenous conflict res-
olution mechanisms have been found to be effective for both
lesser criminal cases such as stock theft, land disputes and
serious crimes such as genocide as seen in Rwanda (ECA,
2007). Hence incorporating such respected institutions orig-
inating from customary law and indigenous knowledge into
climate change policies is likely to result in formulation of
effective adaptation strategies that will be participatory and
highly acceptable by the rest of the community.
c. Local chief
Loitoktok has 16 locations each governed by a chief and 31
sub-chiefs who are in-charge of sub-locations. These chief-
taincy positions are not elective but the person is nominated
by the government to participate in decision-making at the
grassroots. The chiefs work under the Sub-County Govern-
ment (SCG) office and are called upon by the government
depending on the conflict situation in the community. The
administrative council of elders also falls under the SCG of-
fice as a physical representation of the government in the
community. These quasi-formal arrangements are alternative
institutions that are peripherally involved in resource gover-
nance but can also improve the climate change discourse in
Africa. The chiefs and council of elders can identify isolated
rural community interest groups for training in resource gov-
ernance including conflict resolution since unmanaged infor-
mal groups form many small and dense clusters with little
or no diversity and little adaptation knowledge that become
resistant to change. An example is pastoralists who view live-
stock as a form of wealth and calls by extension officers
to dispose of healthy animals before onset of drought are
viewed with suspicion. Furthermore, chiefs can conduct civic
lessons among their constituents as a means of promoting in-
tegration and coexistence and dispelling false information to
foster the concept of “a common people with a common des-
tiny” (Aapengnuo, 2010).
d. Private investors and researchers
The Loitoktok network has many private organizations such
as hotel owners, seed companies’ researchers, humanitarian
workers etc. in all the resource sectors. Most private actors
are seen to be more effective in resolving conflicts in the
wildlife sector as a way of preserving the wildlife resource
that attracts tourists to the area. Societal decision-making is
nested in a wider set of societal changes, such as institutional
changes and altered relations between public and private ac-
tors. Thus, for a community to increase its adaptive capac-
ity then it should incorporate all stakeholders in developing
land and resource management designs to make them more
effective and relevant to investors. Apart from formal insti-
tutions and the non-governmental organizations, communi-
ties should incorporate local investors who have financial
and technical ability to support the community in sustain-
able use of biodiversity and practical knowledge to maintain
ecosystems in good condition to avoid conflicts over scarce
resources especially during drought.
6 Conclusions
A number of studies have used economic, political and
ecological aspects to expound resource conflicts in several
African countries. However, few studies (some of which are
discussed in Sect. 2.1) have documented the social structures
that induce or resolve conflicts at the grassroots. This study
confirms that in post-colonial Kenya, resource governance
still contains vestiges of traditional institutions, especially
in collective discussion of grievance towards effective con-
flict resolution. The innovative arrangements make use of in-
digenous knowledge to calm the aggrieved and agitate for
compensation by the government. As a result, this integra-
tion binds the society together by its inherent customs based
on brotherhood notions for enhanced resource utilization and
livelihoods, regardless of climatic conditions.
Secondly, climate change threatens to disrupt conflict res-
olution mechanisms that are operational in rural centres be-
cause of capacity challenges associated with Africa’s low
technical ability to manage climate governance, poor inte-
gration of diverse opinions and marginalization of indige-
nous knowledge into adaptation and mitigation agendas. We
based the field study on the Loitoktok Sub-County that is
expanding in terms of its cultural diversity, economic sec-
tors and profile of resource conflict which is representative
of many rural areas in Kenya as well as sub-Saharan coun-
tries. Results indicate that conflict resolution was achieved
through three forms of institutions, each unique to its natural
resource. The water sector relied upon its comprehensive pol-
icy; agriculture used a quasi-formal arrangement while the
wildlife sector formulated its own hybrid arrangement that
involved private investors and the traditional council of Maa-
sai elders. In extreme cases, the community came together in
barazas to air their concerns and agree on a collective deci-
sion acceptable to all relevant stakeholders.
Implementation of conflict-sensitive adaptation requires a
deep understanding of the context in which climate-driven
resource-conflicts are resolved in a community and clearly
delineated actor interactions between local resource-related
activities. Therefore, we used the betweenness centrality in-
dex drawn from the flourishing field of social network the-
ory to evaluate the central actors with potential to broker
adaptation knowledge across the Loitoktok network. Re-
sults indicate that extension officers, council of elders, lo-
cal chief and private investors are the suitable central ac-
tors who should be financially and technologically equipped
for building conflict-sensitive adaptive capacity in the com-
munity. Thus government and non-government stakeholders
must work together to identify risks and formulate strategies
and programmes that can help raise awareness among civil
society of the impact of climate change.
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As a contribution to the climate and security discourse, this
study advocates for two adaptive co-management measures
to help overcome climate change-related capacity challenges
at the grassroots in Africa. First, clear conflict resolution pol-
icy in natural resource governance as seen in the water sec-
tor will help solve local conflicts and also enable stakehold-
ers to understand local conflict genesis and effectively pre-
pare for unpredictable climatic conditions. Secondly, involv-
ing diverse actors from the community in resolving conflict
as seen in the wildlife sector, also has potential in serving as
a conduit of the adaptation knowledge sector that empower
the community despite policy inadequacies. Moreover, tradi-
tional institutions like the council of elders have been seen
as a source of civic knowledge, and encourage respect of lo-
cal values and customs that contribute to community self-
reliance and empowerment in the community.
To conclude, natural resource regulations and governance
arrangements play important roles in handling potential con-
flicts over scarce natural resources, particularly water in arid
and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Thus resource conflict resolu-
tion and positive culture transmission should be part of an
effective conflict-sensitive adaptation strategy. These two as-
pects encourage growth of cohesive social capital that in turn
enhances economic development at the grassroots and effec-
tive governance of the commons.
The Supplement related to this article is available online
at doi:10.5194/esd-7-441-2016-supplement.
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